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WHITAKER WRIGHT 
by 
Robert Gibson, Deakin University 
Glenn A. Vent, University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
Fraud is a significant problem for con-
temporary businesses, but it is not a new 
problem. Business fraud was common dur-
ing the 1890s. This paper examines several 
accounting issues that were central to 
Whitaker Wright's trial. 
In 1904 a London jury convicted 
Whitaker Wright of issuing false balance 
sheets and the judge sentenced him to seven 
years penal servitude. Moments later in a 
courthouse waiting room Wright swallowed 
a lethal dose of cyanide. Thus ended the dra-
matic career of a corporate promoter, a spec-
ulator, and a leading figure in the Western 
Australian gold mining craze of the 1890s. 
The prosecutors had charged Wright 
with issuing false balance sheets, a violation 
of the Larceny Act of 1861. The trial lasted 
two weeks and each day's testimony 
appeared in The Times. Wright's guilt or 
innocence hinged upon the propriety of his 
accounting practices. The testimony has 
many moments of drama and humor as 
Whitaker Wright steadfastly maintained his 
innocence in the face of an unsympathetic 
judge and overwhelming evidence of guilt. 
Background 
Whitaker Wright was born in England 
in 1845. At age twenty-one he migrated to 
the United States where he married and 
became a naturalized citizen. Wright began 
his career as an assayer and mining engineer. 
Successfully speculating in Colorado and 
New Mexico mines, he amassed a fortune of 
over one million dollars. He returned to 
England in 1889. 
The 1894 discovery of massive gold 
deposits in Western Australia created a 
great demand in London for speculative 
mining ventures. Capitalizing on this 
opportunity Wright successfully promoted 
one venture after another. By 1899, Wright 
controlled several rich mines in Australia 
and Canada including the Lake View 
Consols, the Ivanhoe, and the Le Roy mines. 
He could have enjoyed a distinguished and 
rewarding career had he chosen to manage 
these companies prudently, but that was not 
in his nature. 
Wright could not resist the lure of 
stock speculation. As the first person in 
London to receive cables from the mine 
superintendents, he occupied an excellent 
position to trade on inside information. 
Unfortunately for Wright, the manager of 
the Lake View Consols Mine decided to 
engage in a little insider trading on his own 
account. The mine manager fed false esti-
mates of vast ore reserves to the London 
office. Relying on those reports, Wright 
speculated heavily. He gambled his own 
money and he gambled the funds of the 
companies that he controlled. The compa-
nies lost over £1 million during 1899 and 
early 1900, and these losses were rapidly 
overwhelming Wright's business empire. To 
recoup the losses and avoid financial ruin, he 
restored to additional insider trading. For 
that plan to work, Whitaker Wright needed 
cash, and he needed time. Thus, he hid the 
true condition of his companies by falsifying 
the financial statements of the London & 
Globe Finance Corporation for September 
30, 1899 and December 17, 1990. 
Accounting and Reporting Practices 
At the annual 1899 shareholder meeting 
of the London & Globe Finance Corporation, 
Whitaker Wright boasted that the firm's 
large cash balance of £534,000 proved the 
strength and good management of the com-
pany. Yet only two days before the prepara-
tion of the financial statements the ledgers 
showed a cash balance of only £80,000. How 
did the cash account grow so quickly? 
According to the prosecutor, most of the 
change resulted from honest, although 
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unusual, transactions. However, the prosecu-
tion challenged one transaction that involved 
£72,000 in cash received from the Standard 
Exploration Company, another Wright com-
pany. London & Globe accountants recorded 
this transaction as a cash sale of an investment 
in Nickel Corporation stock. Nevertheless, 
the Standard's accountants recorded this 
transaction as a short term loan to the Globe 
secured by the Nickel Corporation stock. 
These two treatments might appear to be the 
result of an honest difference of opinion. 
Whose accountants were right, the Globe's or 
the Standard's? Actually, they were the same 
people because accounting for both compa-
nies was handled by a common staff operat-
ing out of a single London office. 
Whi taker Wr igh t delayed the prepara-
tion of the annual report for 1900 unti l 
E>ecember 17 as he frantically adjusted 
(cooked) the accounts. W r i g h t testified 
there "was no strict date for the making up 
of accounts. Mining companies made them 
when it suited them" {The Times, Jan. 2 1 , 
1904). In 1900, British law permit ted cor-
porations to issue annual reports on any date 
wi th in the calendar year. The Globe report-
ed a profit of £479 ,000 , but the prosecutor 
claimed there were several major errors in 
the earnings figure. 
One alleged accounting error involved 
underwri t ing commissions recognized as 
revenue. This complex tale begins with 
Victoria Gold Estate Ltd, a firm whose 
largest asset consisted of gold claims that 
could not be profitably exploited because of 
technical problems. Thus , the company's pri-
mary asset was nearly worthless. Whi taker 
Wr igh t concocted a scheme of split t ing 
Victoria Gold Estate's property between two 
new firms, Lodden Valley and Moorlort. He 
organized Lodden Valley on November 23 , 
1900 and London & Globe received 20,000 
Lodden shares as a commission. The London 
& Globe accountants recorded these shares at 
their par value al though the Lodden's miner-
al claims had little, if any, value. 
Perhaps to confirm this valuation on 
November 30, 1900, London & Globe sold 
the 20 ,000 Lodden shares to Br i t i sh 
America Company for £100 ,000 . O n the 
same day British America Company paid 
another £ 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 for 20 ,000 shares of 
Moorlort common. The second sale was 
remarkable because Moorlort Company did 
not exist unt i l the following day. 
A second error illustrates the difficulty 
of maintaining consistency while manufac-
turing events and manipulat ing accounts. 
From July through September 30, 1900, 
London & Globe received loans from three 
affiliated Canadian m i n i n g companies . 
Wr igh t settled these debts by recognizing 
an expected distr ibution of profits from the 
same three firms. Unfortunately, London & 
Globe had already sold all of its investments 
in the three mines on Nov. 22, 1900. Thus , 
it no longer held any shares upon which to 
expect a distribution. Wr igh t must have lost 
track and sold the investment before he 
declared the dividends. Even W h i t a k e r 
Wrigh t admit ted that this was an error that 
he courageously blamed on the company 
accountants. 
Another impor t an t issue involved 
accounting for investments in equity securi-
ties, the Globe's largest category of assets. 
The balance sheet stated these investments 
were carried at the lower of cost or market . 
The following testimony by Wr igh t (The 
Times, Jan. 20, 1904) relates to the invest-
ment accounts: 
The Prosecutor—Has market value 
anything at all to do with your bal-
ance-sheets? 
W r i g h t — I do not think it has much. 
The Prosecutor—Has it anything? 
W r i g h t — T h e rule is that we do not 
consider market value. 
The J u d g e — T h e n this is imagina-
tion that "if the market value of the 
shares was less than cost, they were 
marked down to market value"? 
Wr igh t—I t is the sort of statement 99 
chairmen out of 100 would make at a 
shareholders' meeting. (Laughter.) 
Continued on page 21 
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Wright Continued from page 15 
Wright explained that investments were 
valued at average cost if acquired for cash, 
and at par value when exchanged for mine 
property. On December 17, 1900 the invest-
ment account had a balance of £2 .3 million. 
If these investments had been recorded at fair 
market value, the account would have had a 
balance of about £1 million. 
The most important business event of 
1900 for London & Globe Finance Company 
was the loss incurred from speculating in 
Lake View Consol shares. Wright concealed 
this event by transferring the loss to an affil-
iated company. O n November 29, 1900, 
W r i g h t transferred to the Standard 
Exploration Company an investment of £1.6 
million in Lake View Consols common. As 
part of the transaction he also eliminated 
London & Globe's related liability. This was 
a sham transaction that was reversed one 
month later when London & Globe Finance 
Company announced that it was insolvent. 
The market value of this investment was far 
less than the book value. 
Conc lus ions 
The case of Whitaker Wright contained 
several red flags that should have warned the 
auditors, but did not. For instance, Wright 
was a promoter of Western Australian gold 
mines. This was a high risk business with a 
history of stock manipulations. In similar sit-
uations, such as the savings and loan industry 
of the 1980s, auditors should have been espe-
cially careful. In addition, Wright 's extrava-
gant lifestyle should also have been viewed as 
a sign of his fraudulent activities. The fre-
quent sales of mineral claims between affili-
ated companies controlled by Wright indi-
cated the possibility of a deception. The delay 
of the 1900 annual report signaled a clear 
warning to all interested parties. Finally the 
flurry of large and unusual transactions that 
always occurred just before the end of the fis-
cal year should have alarmed the auditors. 
Wi th so many red flags, it is surprising that 
the fraud remained undetected for so long. 
Whi taker Wr igh t issued false balance 
sheets with the intent of deceiving investors 
and creditors. Many people were harmed by 
his schemes, and he was not selective about 
whom he hurt . Nonetheless, it is difficult to 
sympathize with the stockholders because 
gold mines are an inherently risky invest-
men t . Pensioners, widows and orphans 
should not invest in such enterprises. In his 
defense Wr igh t argued that his accounting 
and business activities were commonplace in 
the mining industry. Wr igh t seemed to be 
genuinely surprised tha t he had been 
charged for such practices. In fact, it was 
unusual to be arrested for issuing deceptive 
financial reports in 1900. The reporter for 
the New York Times did not believe that 
Whi taker Wright 's activities would have 
consti tuted criminal behavior under the 
laws of the United States. However, he con-
cluded that American investors would sleep 
better if our business laws were more like 
those of the Uni ted Kingdom. 
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A THOUGHT FROM THE PAST 
"Culture is activity of thought and responsiveness to 
beauty and humane feeling." 
— A . N. Whitehead 
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